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Abstract 
This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, 
proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to 
predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument 
using cross-country data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. 
We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated 
with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative 
impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by 
offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and government size in the literature. 
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During the past decades, numerous countries worldwide, both developed and 
developing countries, have undergone decentralization in terms of their fiscal, political, 
and administrative structures. The growing interest for this topic in academic research 
has triggered intense discussions on its various aspects, especially the consequences of 
fiscal decentralization. To date, the literature has identified a wide range of potential 
impacts of fiscal decentralization on a country, including economic growth, regional 
disparity, macroeconomic stability, corruption, and government size (see Martinez-
Vazquez et al., 2017 for a survey). Among them, one of the most relevant and discussed 
consequences is the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size, for which 
limited consensus has been reached, both theoretically and empirically (Golem, 2010).  
This paper re-examines empirically the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
government size by considering the role of a country’s political regime (proxied by 
democracy). We contribute to the literature by offering a novel explanation on the 
mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
government size in the literature. Theoretically, fiscal decentralization, as explained in 
the subsequent section, has important implications on government size, although 
competing explanations exist. Specifically, by assuming the government as a 
benevolent agent that serves the needs of its constituents, the “first-generation” of fiscal 
federalism argues that, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences and needs across 
different jurisdictions, fiscal decentralization may increase the efficiency and quality of 
government services because it allows for a closer match between the preferences of 
residents and the packages of public goods and services provided by local governments 
(Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Weingast, 2009). Therefore, greater decentralization can 
be considered to enhance local accountability and residents’ trust in government, which 
motivates them to demand more public goods and services, hence leading to a greater 
government size (Golem, 2010). By assuming the government as a monolithic 
Leviathan, with selfish public officials to maximize revenues, as opposed to the 
benevolent government assumed in the previous literature, the “second-generation” of 




and firms), tax competition among governments under the decentralized system 
destroys the Leviathan’s monopoly on taxation and brings government spending closer 
to the preferences of residents, thus potentially leading to less bureaucratic waste of 
resources and a smaller size for government spending (Weingast, 2009; Golem, 2010).  
Therefore, these different predictions for the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and government size are based, at least partially, on the particular 
political regimes that give rise to different government types. We argue that, compared 
to non-democratic regimes, democratic regimes are more likely to support a benevolent 
government, meaning fiscal decentralization in democratic countries is more likely to 
improve local accountability, resulting in a relatively larger government size. We test 
this hypothesis using a cross-country dataset of 76 developed and developing countries 
for the period 1972–2013. We find strong evidence that (1) overall, fiscal 
decentralization is negatively associated with government size, supporting 
decentralization as a device to promote local competition thus restricting government 
size increases, and (2) fiscal decentralization in countries with a higher level of 
democracy tends to have a smaller negative impact on government size than countries 
with lower democracy levels. We thus contribute to the literature by providing an 
explanation that integrates the apparently conflicting views on the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and government size. These results are robust across alternative 
measures of key variables and alternative specifications, data frames, and estimation 
approaches. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and discusses the potential role of democracy in the nexus between fiscal 
decentralization and government size. Section 3 proposes the empirical methodology 
and discusses the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 provides 






2. Literature Review 
 2.1. Fiscal decentralization and government size  
The literature of fiscal federalism has long discussed the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on government size. Particularly, two different viewpoints dominate 
the literature, both empirically controversial. The first viewpoint originates from the 
traditional theory of fiscal federalism, the so-called “first-generation” of fiscal 
federalism, which draws heavily from the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), Musgrave 
(1959), and Oates (1972), among others. In this literature stream, governments are 
assumed to act benevolently in the interest of residents, who are in turn assumed to be 
able to move freely to jurisdictions best suiting their preferences. Therefore, the 
devolution of tax and expenditure authority under a decentralized system improves the 
efficiency of public goods provision because decentralization leads to information 
advantages and, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, allows local 
governments to response more flexibly to the needs and preferences of their residents. 
The resulting increases in local accountability and residents’ trust in the government 
further motivate residents to demand more public goods and services, hence leading to 
an expansion in government size. In other words, with the presumption of government 
benevolence and resident mobility, government size is determined by the demand for 
government expenditure, while decentralization helps stimulate demand. 
Apart from the demand-side explanation of the impact of fiscal decentralization 
on government size, the development of fiscal federalism literature, the so-called 
“second-generation” of fiscal federalism, introduces a supply-side explanation, which 
results in an opposite prediction of the impact of fiscal decentralization on government 
size. Specifically, by abandoning the assumption of a benevolent government, this 
literature stream assumes the government to be selfish, depicted as a monolithic 
Leviathan that seeks to maximize revenues and expand its scale through excessive 
taxation, deficit, and money generation (Weingast, 2009; Golem, 2010). Therefore, a 
centralized system, compared to a decentralized one, makes the government easier to 




taxpayers or citizens to control such a large government. In this case, the 
decentralization of taxation and spending power is argued to be a potentially effective 
way to constrain an unreasonable expansion of the government because 
decentralization may trigger an inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile tax bases 
(i.e., firms and residents), meaning any attempt by a local jurisdiction to abuse taxation 
and/or spending will result in the relocation of its tax bases to an alternative jurisdiction. 
Owing to this competitive pressure, each local jurisdiction tends to reduce its tax 
burden, which consequently affects the supply of local public goods and services. In an 
extreme case, the fierce tax competition under a decentralized economy may even result 
in the so-called “race to the bottom” phenomenon, characterized by an inefficiently low 
tax rate and, hence, a reduced government size (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; 
Wilson, 1986, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004). 
Empirically, numerous studies investigate the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and government size using different datasets, time frames, and 
econometric methods, but no consensus seems to have been hitherto reached. In an 
early stage, Oates (1985), Nelson (1986), Marlow (1988), and Forbes and Zampelli 
(1989) made pioneering contributions to this research area. Oates (1985) uses a sample 
of 48 US contiguous states and 43 developed and developing countries and fails to find 
a significant Leviathan effect. By using US state and county data, respectively, Nelson 
(1986) and Forbes and Zampelli (1989) do not find significant results in support of the 
Leviathan hypothesis either. Nevertheless, Marlow (1988) identifies a negative and 
significant impact of expenditure decentralization, measured by the ratio of state and 
local government spending to total government spending, on government size by using 
US national-level data for the period 1946–1985. Grossman (1989) reports the same 
finding as those of Marlow (1988) and further emphasizes that intergovernmental grants 
increase government size due to the moral hazard behaviors of local governments. 
Recent research showed increasing attention to cross-country datasets. For 
instance, Ehdaie (1994) uses two cross-country datasets for two different years and 




explores a Latin American country dataset with a special focus on intergovernmental 
transfers and finds vertical fiscal imbalance and borrowing autonomy tend to increase 
government size. Jin and Zou (2002) provide a more detailed classification of different 
government levels, and find that fiscal decentralization reduces the size of the national 
government but increases the sizes of sub-national governments, overall increasing the 
size of governments. Rodden (2003) investigates a panel dataset covering 19 OECD 
countries from 1985 to 1995, and suggests that a smaller government size corresponds 
to a decentralized system where local governments are primarily financed by local tax 
revenues instead of intergovernmental grants. Based on a large cross-country dataset 
and using the total number of public-sector employees as a measure of government size, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) find that, ceteris paribus, a country’s government 
size increases with its level of fiscal decentralization. Particularly, while fiscal 
decentralization decreases central government employment, it is more than fully offset 
by the increases in employment at the subnational level that accompany 
decentralization.  
 2.2. Why does democracy matter? 
As previously discussed, the nexus between fiscal decentralization and government size 
is neither theoretically definitive nor empirically clear. We argue an increased focus 
needs to be placed on the relevance of political regimes, since they have strong 
implications for the functioning of different theories and thus condition the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and government size. Particularly, the traditional theory 
of fiscal federalism, which predicts a larger government size in decentralized 
economies assumes: (i) the presence of a benevolent government that is responsive and 
accountable for the preferences and needs of local residents and (ii) the mobility of 
residents reinforcing inter-jurisdictional competition and enhancing local 
accountability, since residents can vote “with their feet” and arrange themselves into 
homogeneous communities, where their preferences are maximized. Under these 
assumptions, it seems unlikely the aforementioned prediction of the traditional theory 




mature democracy, the various monitoring mechanisms, such as elections and press 
freedom, may function well, which is essential to guarantee the existence of a 
benevolent government that acts in the interest of residents (Karlström, 2015). Further, 
to ensure inter-jurisdictional competition as an effective mechanism to improve local 
accountability, there must be institutions supporting the free mobility of residents 
across jurisdictions, so that residents are able to vote with their feet, and free 
information should flow to residents and firms, so that they can compare policy 
outcomes and government quality in their home jurisdiction with those of other 
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, these freedoms are typically restricted in many non-
democratic or authoritarian countries (Beyani, 2000). Consequently, the prediction of 
the traditional theory of fiscal federalism for a larger government size is more likely to 
occur in countries with democratic institutions. We thus hypothesize that the level of 
democracy may condition the relationship between decentralization and government 
size. As such, by exploring the role of democracy, we also offer another explanation 
for the inconsistent results in the empirical literature on the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and government size.  
3. Empirical Strategy and Data  
3.1. Econometric specification 
We investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on government size, with a particular 
focus on the role of democracy. To achieve this purpose, we estimate the following 
fixed effects model: 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 +
𝜑𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,                                                                                                                             
(1) 
where the dependent variable (i.e., 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) represents the government size of 
country i in year t. 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 is the fiscal decentralization indicator of the country and is 
lagged by one period to avoid the potential endogeneity issue. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 is a lagged 
democracy index. 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 is the interaction term between the two 




to find a positive sign for coefficient 𝛿, implying that with the increase in the democratic 
level of a country, fiscal decentralization is more likely to result in a larger government 
size. 𝜇𝑖 is the time-invariant and country-specific effect of country i; 𝜑𝑡 is a set of year 
dummies, and 𝑖𝑡 is the i.i.d. error term. 
Regarding the control variable 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1, we seek to capture the general 
determinants of government size based on the empirical literature. These include real 
GDP per capita, share of the secondary sector in total GDP, trade openness, 
urbanization rate, and demographic variables. Real GDP per capita (in log form) and 
the share of the secondary sector in total GDP stand for the economic development 
level of the country. It has long been argued that economic development generally leads 
to a simultaneous increase in the demand for more and better public services (e.g., 
Wagner, 1893; Akitoby et al., 2006; Wu and Lin, 2012). Trade openness is typically 
believed to lead to a larger government size, as voters seek insurance against external 
shocks when the country is exposed to international trade (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 
1998). However, a competing view is that openness restrains government size by 
imposing balance of payments constraints, thus  reducing the power of domestic special 
interests (Ferris et al., 2008). As such, we include trade openness, measured as the ratio 
of total trade (exports and imports) to GDP, to control for this effect. Additionally, the 
urbanization rate can be presumed to determine government consumption and 
investment (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998), and we capture this effect by measuring it as 
the share of urban population to total population. Finally, the relative size of the non-
working population may matter for the level of public expenditure because a younger 
population demands more education services, while the elderly require more health 
care. Therefore, we might hypothesize that governments will be larger in countries 
where the non-working population represents a greater percentage of the total 
population. We thus follow Rodden (2003) and others in capturing this factor through 
two variables—the proportion of individuals aged 0–14 and of those aged 65 and above. 
All control variables are lagged by one period to avoid any bias due to the concern of 





The panel dataset we used covers 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–
2013.2 The variables are derived from a wide range of sources. Our measure of 
government size, as the ratio of total general government expenditure to the GDP, is 
obtained from the World Development Indicators database. This measure of 
government size is a traditional one in the literature (see, for example, Stein, 1999; Jin 
and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003; Kotera et al., 2012).   
Measuring the extent of fiscal decentralization has been long debated in both 
theoretical and empirical studies largely because fiscal decentralization happens along 
several dimensions and at different paces. Therefore, no single indicator can adequately 
capture the full picture of this process, which would ideally be measured separately for 
each dimension (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; Stegarescu, 2005). 
Nevertheless, this issue can be at least partially overcome by considering alternative 
indicators that reflect the different aspects of the decentralization process (Liu et al., 
2017). Consequently, we measure a country’s fiscal decentralization by simultaneously 
considering both expenditure and revenue. Of these two indicators, expenditure 
decentralization, defined as the ratio of state and local government spending to total 
general government spending, has been most widely used in the literature (e.g., Oates, 
1985; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; de Mello, 2000), as it captures the degree of local 
governments’ expenditure responsibilities in the public sector, that is, it quantifies who 
does what. Therefore, we rely on expenditure decentralization as our primary measure 
of fiscal decentralization and utilize revenue decentralization as an alternative measure 
of fiscal decentralization to verify the robustness of our results. The data for both 
measures of fiscal decentralization are obtained from the World Bank’s 
Decentralization Indicator database, which calculates the indexes based on raw data 
from the Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. 
                                                          




Democracy, another key variable of interest, is a relative concept that reflects the 
degree of civil liberties and political rights across countries. We construct it by using 
the average of political rights and civil liberties provided by the Freedom House.3 
However, it is rescaled to take values from 0 to 10, with larger values signifying a more 
democratic regime. All other economic variables are derived from the World 
Development Indicator database. Variable definitions are presented in Table A2 in the 
Appendix and summary statistics are reported in Table 1. 
4. Main Empirical Results  
Table 2 presents the estimation results for baseline model (1), where fiscal 
decentralization is measured through its expenditure. All specifications are estimated 
using a fixed effects model. 
To begin with, we examine the net effect of fiscal decentralization on government 
size without considering the role of democracy. Columns (1) and (2) respectively report 
the results controlling or not for year fixed effects in the estimations. The coefficient of 
expenditure decentralization is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in 
both columns, suggesting an increase of fiscal decentralization leads to a smaller 
government size. This finding lends support to the prediction of the “second-
generation” of fiscal federalism, which presumes the existence of a Leviathan-type 
government, meaning decentralization tends to restrict the growth in government 
spending by encouraging an inter-jurisdictional tax competition. Quantitatively, taking 
Column (2) as reference, the estimated net effect of the expenditure decentralization is 
-0.069, implying a one percentage point increase in expenditure decentralization 
reduces government size (i.e., total government expenditure as a percent of GDP) by 
0.069 percentage points.  
                                                          
3 In the Freedom House index, both “political rights” and “civil liberties” range from 1 (most free) to 7 
(least free). The indicators for political rights include an effective election system of public institutions, 
political party pluralism, fair elections and voting rights, and the decentralization of political power. 
The indicators of civil liberties include the public freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and 




However, the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) may not be precise. This is because, 
as illustrated in Section 2, the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size may 
depend on the political regime in which the decentralization system operates. 
Particularly, the level of democracy in a country may act as a significant and direct 
determinant of the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. Thus, we 
consider the interaction effect between fiscal decentralization and democracy. This 
interaction term allows us to evaluate how the democracy level in a country influences 
the effect of fiscal decentralization on government size. Columns (3) and (4) provide 
the results for when the interaction term between fiscal decentralization and democracy 
is added. As predicted, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term is significantly 
positive, implying the negative effect of fiscal decentralization on government size is 
diminishing with the increase of a country’s democracy level. This result is largely 
consistent with our previous theoretical demonstration that democracy may condition 
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size, particularly the 
prediction of the traditional theory of fiscal federalism that a larger government size is 
more likely in countries with democratic institutions.  
While the results above are informative, they remain somewhat limited as they do 
not directly indicate the net partial impact of fiscal decentralization on government size 
or whether fiscal decentralization has a statistically significant impact on government 
size when the democracy level of a country does not equal 0.4 Therefore, based on 
Column (4) of Table 2, we illustrate in Figure 1 the marginal effect of fiscal 
decentralization on government size across the observed range of democracy levels. 
The solid sloping line indicates how the marginal effect of fiscal decentralization 
changes as the level of democracy of a country increases, while the two dashed lines, 
representing 95% confidence intervals, allow us to determine the conditions under 
which fiscal decentralization has a statistically significant effect on government size—
                                                          
4 In specifications with interaction terms, the statistical significance of an individual variable does not necessarily 




the net effect of fiscal decentralization is significant whenever the upper and lower 
bounds of the confidence interval are both below 0. As per Figure 1, the partial effect 
of fiscal decentralization is strictly negative and statistically significant through the 
entire range of democracy. Nevertheless, the increase in the democracy level clearly 
indicates the negative effect of fiscal equalization is diminishing.  
Regarding the other control variables, the results are mostly consistent with our 
prediction. Real GDP per capita has positive and significant coefficients, supporting 
Wagner’s law in that economic development leads to a larger demand of public goods 
and services. Trade openness contributes to a smaller government size, indicating 
openness may restraint government size by imposing balance of payments constraints. 
The proportion of the younger population is positively associated with government size, 
reflecting the special needs of government services from this group. The estimates for 
other control variables are generally statistically insignificant.  
5.  Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of the main results, we conduct sensitivity analyses along three 
dimensions: using alternative measures of the key variables, that is, fiscal 
decentralization, government size, and democracy; using an alternative data structure; 
and using an alternative specification addressing the endogeneity concern of fiscal 
decentralization. In all robustness checks, we find results from the specifications 
equivalent to those in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.  
5.1. Alternative measures of key variables 
We first use alternative measures for the key variables. Instead of measuring 
decentralization from the expenditure side, we consider its revenue side, which may 
reflect different aspects of the fiscal decentralization process. Specifically, we measure 
revenue decentralization as the ratio of state and local government revenue to total 
general government revenue and re-estimate specification (1). The estimated results are 
reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. The estimated coefficient of revenue 




with democracy remains significantly positive. Moreover, the quantitative effects of 
revenue decentralization are also similar to those of expenditure decentralization in 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. Second, we conduct the estimations using another 
proxy for government size—total employment in the public sector (in log form)—
which is another popular measure of government size in the literature (see, for example, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Yao, 2009). The estimated results are shown in Columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 3, with expenditure decentralization being negatively and significantly 
associated with the new measure of government size. The interaction term between 
expenditure decentralization and democracy is positive and statistically significant at 
the margin in Column (3) of Table 3. However, it is also statistically significant in 
Column (4) of Table 3, when year fixed effects are controlled for.  
Further, we use an alternative democracy index to perform robustness checks. 
That is, the index of political democracy and autocracy derived from the Polity IV 
Project dataset, which ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly 
democratic). The variable is a combination of three independent elements of 
institutionalized democracy: (i) presence of institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative politicians and leaders, (ii) 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, and 
(iii) guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily life and for acts of political 
participation. Because of its comprehensiveness in measuring democracy, this variable 
has also been frequently used in the literature (e.g., Swamy et al., 2001; Gatti, 2004). 
Therefore, we use it as an alternative democracy measure and re-estimate the model. 
The estimated results are documented in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3, according to 
which expenditure decentralization has a negative impact on government size, while 
the democracy level of a country tends to mitigate this negative impact.  
5.2. Alternative data structure  
To further verify the robustness of the results, we alternatively explore a different data 




decentralization and government size because the latter variable is likely to be affected 
by short-run business cycles and the level of democracy in a country is generally stable 
for long periods of time, focusing on the average values of our variables may help 
reduce the short-run fluctuations and allow us to examine the long-run relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and government size and how it varies across different 
democracy levels. Consequently, we re-estimate specification (1) by transforming 
yearly data into 5-year intervals (i.e., 1972–1974, 1975–1979, …, 2005–2009, 2010–
2013) and 10-year intervals (i.e., 1972–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1999, 2000–2009, 
2010–2013). The results are reported in Table 4 and are largely unchanged compared 
to the baseline results in Table 2, with only the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
term being quantitatively larger. Therefore, our baseline results seem not to be affected 
by the short-run business cycle and the potential measurement errors.  
5.3. Addressing the endogeneity concern  
An important concern in estimating specification (1) is that of potential endogeneity for 
a country’s fiscal decentralization. Theoretically, this issue may arise because of reverse 
causality, omitted variable bias, or measurement errors. Although we have tried to 
mitigate this issue to a large extent in the previous estimations, namely taking one-
period lags of all explanatory variables and utilizing alternative measures of key 
variables and data frames, the endogeneity issue may still be of concern. Previous 
studies on the impacts of fiscal decentralization have also acknowledged the potential 
endogeneity bias in their estimates, although they do not explicitly control for it,5 to a 
large extent due to small sample sizes and lack of adequate instruments (e.g., Zhang 
and Zou, 1998; Jin et al., 2005; Qiao et al., 2008). Here, we account for the potential 
endogeneity issue of fiscal decentralization more explicitly by using an instrumental 
variable approach. The instruments we use include one- and two-period lagged values 
of the weighted average of fiscal decentralization from neighboring countries (weighed 
                                                          




by the contiguity matrix6). The validity of this instrument is justified by the design of 
fiscal decentralization policy in a country being possibly correlated with the design of 
decentralization policies in neighboring countries because of their geographical 
similarity and potential competitive and mimicking behaviors, while the government 
size of a country should have virtually no direct impact on the design of the fiscal 
decentralization of neighboring countries in the preceding years.  
Table 5 documents the results of the instrumental variable method, where fiscal 
decentralization is treated as an endogenous variable. For all specifications, the F-
statistics are close to or above 10, which suggests the relevancy of our instruments is 
indeed strong. Additionally, the Hansen J Statistic of over-identification restriction in 
Table 5 is in almost all cases above 0.10, implying we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between the instruments and error term in the regressions.  
Comparing the results in Tables 5 and 2 confirms our earlier findings: fiscal 
decentralization leads to a smaller government size, while the democracy level of a 
country helps reduce the negative effect of fiscal decentralization on government size. 
Further, the parameter estimates in Table 5 are quantitatively larger than those in Table 
2, potentially suggesting the endogeneity issue may lead to under-estimated effects of 
fiscal decentralization and democracy in the baseline estimations.   
6. Concluding Remarks 
The impact of fiscal decentralization on government size has been discussed in great 
depth in the literature, but limited consensus has been reached either theoretically or 
empirically. To explain the mixed results in the literature, we investigate the extent to 
which the level of democracy determines the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
government size. We hypothesize fiscal decentralization is more likely to result in a 
larger government size in a country with a higher democracy level, where a benevolent 
government is more likely to exist and local officers are more likely to be accountable 
                                                          
6 That is, a value of 1 is assigned if two countries share the same border, and 0 otherwise. The 




for the needs of local residents. By contrast, fiscal decentralization is more likely to 
result in a smaller government size in a country with a lower democracy level, where a 
Leviathan-type government is more likely to exist and decentralization tends to restrain 
government size by fostering inter-jurisdictional competition. 
We then confront this theoretical prediction with the results from a cross-
country dataset covering 76 developed and developing countries over 1972–2013. We 
find supporting evidence that an increase in the fiscal decentralization of a country 
reduces the government size and the negative impact of fiscal decentralization tends to 
be weakened in countries with higher democracy levels. These results are robust across 
alternative measures of key variables, alternative data frames, and specifications 
correcting for the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization. 
The results are both academically and policy-wise relevant. Academically, they 
contribute to a better understanding of the nexus between fiscal decentralization and 
government size in the literature. By focusing on the role of democracy, we highlight 
the specific conditions for the potential conflicting predictions of different 
decentralization theories. Consequently, by introducing the determining effect of the 
democracy level, our study thus potentially explains the mixed results in the empirical 
literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. From 
the policy perspective, fiscal decentralization has been advocated by many 
organizations, such as the World Bank, for different reasons. Our results suggest that 
fiscal decentralization may be used to address the inefficient expansion of government 
size in countries without democratic institutions, where decentralization encourages 
inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile tax bases, thus restraining the inefficient use 







Akitoby, B., Clements, B., Gupta, S., & Inchauste, G. (2006). Public spending, 
voracity, and Wagner's law in developing countries. European Journal of 
Political Economy, 22(4), 908-924.   
Alesina, A., & Wacziarg, R. (1998). Openness, country size and government. Journal 
of Public Economics, 69(3), 305-321.   
Beyani, C. (2000). Human rights standards and the free movement of people within 
states. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: 
Improving empirical analyses. Political Analysis, 14(1), 63-85.  
Cameron, D. (1978). The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis. 
American Political Science Review, 72(4), 1243-1261.  
Davoodi, H., & Zou, H.-f. (1998). Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: A 
cross-country study. Journal of Urban Economics, 43(2), 244-257.   
de Mello, L. R. (2000). Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations: 
A cross-country analysis. World Development, 28(2), 365-380.   
Ehdaie, J. (1994). Fiscal decentralization and the size of government: An extension 
with evidence from cross-county data. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper Series, No.1387.  
Ferris, J. S., Park, S.-B., & Winer, S. L. (2008). Studying the role of political 
competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons. Public 
Choice, 137(1), 369-401.   
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002). Decentralization and corruption: Evidence across 
countries. Journal of Public Economics, 83(3), 325-345.  
Forbes, K. F., & Zampelli, E. M. (1989). Is Leviathan a mythical beast? American 
Economic Review, 79(3), 568-577.  
Gatti, R. (2004). Explaining corruption: Are open countries less corrupt? Journal of 
International Development, 16(6), 851-861.   
Golem, S. (2010). Fiscal decentralisation and the size of government: A review of the 
empirical literature. Financial Theory and Practice, 34(1), 53-69.  
Grossman, P. J. (1989). Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension. 
Public Choice, 62(1), 63-69.   
Iimi, A. (2005). Decentralization and economic growth revisited: An empirical note. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 57(3), 449-461.   
Jin, H., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (2005). Regional decentralization and fiscal 
incentives: Federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9), 
1719-1742.   
Jin, J., & Zou, H.-f. (2002). How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, 
national, and subnational government size? Journal of Urban Economics, 
52(2), 270-293.   
Karlström, K. (2015). Decentralization, corruption, and the role of democracy. QoG 




Kotera, G., Okada, K., & Samreth, S. (2012). Government size, democracy, and 
corruption: An empirical investigation. Economic Modelling, 29(6), 2340-
2348.   
Liu, Y., Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Wu, A. M. (2017). Fiscal decentralization, 
equalization, and intra-provincial inequality in China. International Tax and 
Public Finance, 24(2), 248-281.   
Marlow, M. L. (1988). Fiscal decentralization and government size. Public Choice, 
56(3), 259-269.   
Martinez‐Vazquez, J., Lago‐Peñas, S., & Sacchi, A. (2017). The impact of fiscal 
decentralization: A survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 31(4), 1095-1129.   
Martinez-Vazquez, J., & McNab, R. M. (2003). Fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth. World Development, 31(9), 1597-1616.  
Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Yao, M.-H. (2009). Fiscal decentralization and public sector 
employment: A cross-country analysis. Public Finance Review, 37(5), 539-
571.   
Musgrave, R. A. (1959). The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Nelson, M. A. (1986). An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the 
context of the Leviathan model of government. Public Choice, 49(3), 283-294.   
Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Oates, W. E. (1985). Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study. The American 
Economic Review, 75(4), 748-757.   
Qiao, B., Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Xu, Y. (2008). The tradeoff between growth and 
equity in decentralization policy: China's experience. Journal of Development 
Economics, 86(1), 112-128.   
Rodden, J. (2003). Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal federalism and the growth of 
government. International Organization, 57(4), 695-729.   
Rodrik, D. (1998). Why do more open economies have bigger governments? Journal 
of Political Economy, 106(5), 997-1032.   
Stegarescu, D. (2005). Public sector decentralisation: Measurement concepts and 
recent international trends. Fiscal Studies, 26(3), 301-333.   
Stein, E. (1999). Fiscal decentralization and government size in Latin America. 
Journal of Applied Economics, 2, 357-391.   
Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., & Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and corruption. Journal 
of Development Economics, 64(1), 25-55.  
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political 
Economy, 64(5), 416-424.   
Wagner, A. (1893). Grundlegung der Politischen Oekonomie. Leipzig: C.F. 
Wintersche. 
Weingast, B. R. (2009). Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of 
fiscal incentives. Journal of Urban Economics, 65(3), 279-293.   
Wilson, J. D. (1986). A theory of interregional tax competition. Journal of Urban 
Economics, 19(3), 296-315.   





Wilson, J. D., & Wildasin, D. E. (2004). Capital tax competition: Bane or boon. 
Journal of Public Economics, 88(6), 1065-1091.   
Wu, A. M., & Lin, M. (2012). Determinants of government size: Evidence from 
China. Public Choice, 151(1-2), 255–270.  
Zhang, T., & Zou, H.-f. (1998). Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and 
economic growth in China. Journal of Public Economics, 67(2), 221-240.   
Zodrow, G. R., & Mieszkowski, P. (1986). Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the 
underprovision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3), 
356-370.   






Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Government Size 
 
Note: this figure is illustrated based on the results of Column (4) in Table 2. Solid lines represent 
the estimated marginal effect of fiscal decentralization on government size. Dashed lines represent 
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      Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Government size, primary  1,484 29.14 12.17 1.88 97.80 
Government size, alternative 679 6.57 1.52 3.40 10.55 
Expenditure decentralization 1,615 25.31 17.91 0.02 98.76 
Revenue decentralization 1,643 26.73 16.06 0.43 98.76 
Democracy 1 1,660 8.14 2.67 0.50 10.00 
Democracy 2 1,630 6.73 5.49 -10.00 10.00 
GDP per capita (log) 1,660 9.32 1.35 5.43 11.63 
Secondary industry (%) 1,372 31.39 7.49 12.47 72.15 
Openness (%) 1,656 76.32 44.58 4.92 343.56 
Urbanization (%) 1,695 66.08 18.57 9.17 97.69 
Young population (%) 1,695 24.40 8.74 13.23 49.86 
Elderly population (%) 1,695 10.98 4.76 2.21 23.16 
IV: Weighted expenditure decentralization 1,294 28.09 13.97 0.56 98.04 






Table 2. Main Empirical Results 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Expenditure decentralization, t-1 -0.065*** -0.069***  -0.193*** -0.207*** 
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.041) (0.044) 
Expenditure decentralization    0.018*** 0.019*** 
  *Democracy 1, t-1    (0.005) (0.005) 
Democracy 1, t-1    -0.639*** -0.631*** 
    (0.169) (0.171) 
GDP per capita, t-1 6.212*** 2.937**  7.142*** 4.072*** 
 (1.042) (1.319)  (1.060) (1.337) 
Secondary industry, t-1 -0.095** -0.021  -0.162*** -0.089* 
 (0.045) (0.049)  (0.048) (0.052) 
Openness, t-1 -0.058*** -0.069***  -0.060*** -0.070*** 
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.012) 
Urbanization, t-1 0.059 -0.110  0.066 -0.117 
 (0.067) (0.079)  (0.067) (0.079) 
Young population, t-1 0.155 0.232**  0.218** 0.316*** 
 (0.100) (0.103)  (0.107) (0.113) 
Elderly population, t-1 -0.025 -0.241  -0.070 -0.274 
 (0.232) (0.239)  (0.231) (0.238) 
      
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 1,187 1,187  1,176 1,176 
R-squared 0.064 0.120  0.082 0.138 
 Note: The dependent variable is the primary measure of government size. Standard error in parentheses; 







Table 3. Robustness Checks: Alternative Measurement of Key Variables 
 Revenue 
decentralization 
 Government size, 
alternative 
 Democracy 2 






0.211***    
   
 (0.039) (0.041)       
Revenue decentralization 0.022*** 0.025***       
   *Democracy 1, t-1 (0.005) (0.005)       





    (0.003) (0.003)  (0.018) (0.018) 
Expenditure 
decentralization    0.000 0.001** 
   
   *Democracy 1, t-1    (0.000) (0.000)    




0.792***  -0.005 -0.021 
   
 (0.172) (0.176)  (0.014) (0.014)    
Expenditure 
decentralization      
 
0.007*** 0.007*** 
   *Democracy 2, t-1       (0.002) (0.002) 





       (0.062) (0.062) 
GDP per capita, t-1 7.161*** 4.418***  0.115** -0.015  4.356*** 2.613** 
 (1.031) (1.286)  (0.058) (0.065)  (0.878) (1.078) 
Secondary industry, t-1 
-

















 (0.011) (0.012)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.010) (0.011) 
Urbanization, t-1 0.075 -0.118  0.020*** 0.010***  -0.014 -0.139** 
 (0.065) (0.078)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.055) (0.063) 
Young population, t-1 0.190** 0.313***  0.003 0.009  0.043 0.061 
 (0.095) (0.099)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.088) (0.091) 





 (0.227) (0.234)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.191) (0.193) 
       4.356*** 2.613** 
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 1,201 1,201  647 647  1,155 1,155 
R-squared 0.083 0.144  0.114 0.172  0.105 0.196 
 Note: The dependent variable in Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) is the primary measure of government size, while the 
dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the alternative measure of government size. Standard error in 














 Table 4. Robustness Checks: Alternative Data Structure 
  5-year Intervals   10-year Intervals 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Expenditure decentralization, t-1 -0.217*** -0.231***   -0.151 -0.223* 
 (0.079) (0.088)  
 (0.104) (0.116) 
Expenditure decentralization 0.028** 0.029**   0.029* 0.037** 
  *Democracy 1, t-1 (0.012) (0.013)  
 (0.016) (0.018) 
Democracy 1, t-1 -0.886** -0.881**   -0.434 -0.346 
 (0.372) (0.387)   (0.476) (0.490) 
GDP per capita, t-1 6.536*** 6.789**   2.363 4.730 
 (2.484) (3.215)   (3.713) (5.041) 
Secondary industry, t-1 -0.192* -0.205*   -0.068 -0.141 
 (0.099) (0.108)   (0.148) (0.173) 
Openness, t-1 -0.022 -0.024   0.030 0.020 
 (0.029) (0.031)   (0.036) (0.039) 
Urbanization, t-1 -0.156 -0.105   -0.038 -0.000 
 (0.130) (0.161)   (0.148) (0.181) 
Young population, t-1 -0.074 -0.035   0.064 0.266 
 (0.220) (0.245)   (0.285) (0.321) 
Elderly population, t-1 0.047 -0.031   0.497 0.301 
 (0.529) (0.550)   (0.574) (0.603) 
       
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes  
 Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect No Yes  
 No Yes 
Observations 245 245   245 245 
R-squared 0.113 0.125   0.154 0.164 
 Note: The dependent variable is the primary measure of government size. In the estimations of Columns 
(1) and (2), we transform the yearly data into 5-year intervals (i.e., 1972-1974; 1975-1979;…; 2005-
2009; 2010-2013); in the estimations of Columns (3) and (4), we transform the yearly data into 10-year 
intervals (i.e., 1972-1979; 1980-1989; 1990-1999; 2000-2009; 2010-2013). Standard error in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 





Table 5. Robustness Checks: IV Estimations  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Expenditure decentralization, t-1 -0.598*** -0.663***  -1.132** -1.374*** 
 (0.179) (0.187)  (0.460) (0.463) 
Expenditure decentralization    0.094* 0.119** 
  *Democracy 1, t-1    (0.049) (0.049) 
Democracy 1, t-1    -1.581** -1.679** 
    (0.717) (0.720) 
GDP per capita, t-1 0.492 -6.586***  -0.883 -6.401*** 
 (1.146) (1.718)  (1.237) (1.520) 
Secondary industry, t-1 -0.410*** -0.240***  -0.403*** -0.272*** 
 (0.061) (0.055)  (0.057) (0.057) 
Openness, t-1 0.0004 -0.002  -0.003 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
Urbanization, t-1 -0.046 -0.385***  -0.018 -0.288*** 
 (0.064) (0.086)  (0.058) (0.064) 
Young population, t-1 -0.376*** -0.323**  -0.516*** -0.518*** 
 (0.146) (0.154)  (0.110) (0.108) 
Elderly population, t-1 0.398 0.181  0.173 -0.009 
 (0.244) (0.223)  (0.191) (0.189) 
      
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 926 926  918 918 
R-squared 0.068 0.138  0.214 0.309 
IV F-stat 9.59 8.48  23.57 20.44 
Sargan P-values 0.1713 0.3046  0.0948 0.1863 
 Note: The dependent variable is the primary measure of government size. The instruments are one-
period and two-period lagged values of the weighted average of fiscal decentralization from the 
neighboring countries (weighed by the contiguity matrix). Standard error in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 










Table A1. The List of Countries used in the Sample  
1 Albania 21 Czech Republic 41 Jamaica 61 Peru 
2 Argentina 22 Germany 42 Jordan 62 Poland 
3 Armenia 23 Denmark 43 Japan 63 Portugal 
4 Australia 24 Dominican Republic 44 Kazakhstan 64 Paraguay 
5 Austria 25 Spain 45 Korea, Rep. 65 Russian Federation 
6 Azerbaijan 26 Estonia 46 Lesotho 66 El Salvador 
7 Belgium 27 Finland 47 Lithuania 67 Serbia 
8 Bulgaria 28 France 48 Luxembourg 68 Slovak Republic 
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina 29 United Kingdom 49 Latvia 69 Slovenia 
10 Belarus 30 Georgia 50 Morocco 70 Sweden 
11 Bolivia 31 Greece 51 Moldova 71 Thailand 
12 Brazil 32 Honduras 52 Mexico 72 Tunisia 
13 Canada 33 Croatia 53 Macedonia, FYR 73 Turkey 
14 Switzerland 34 Hungary 54 Malta 74 Ukraine 
15 Chile 35 India 55 Mongolia 75 United States 
16 Congo, Rep. 36 Ireland 56 Mauritius 76 South Africa 
17 Colombia 37 Iran, Islamic Rep. 57 Malaysia   
18 Cabo Verde 38 Iceland 58 Netherlands   
19 Costa Rica 39 Israel 59 Norway   






Table A2. Description of Variables and Sources  
Variable Definition Source 
Government size, primary Share of total government expenditure 












Ratio of subnational government 
expenditure to the total general 




Revenue decentralization Ratio of subnational government 
revenue to the total general 




Democracy 1 Average of political right index and 
civil liberties index. It is rescaled to 
take values between 0 and 10, with the 
larger value signifying a more 
democratic regime 
Freedom House 
Democracy 2 The index of political democracy 
and autocracy 
The Polity IV 
Project dataset 
GDP per capita, log Real GDP per capita (1985 fixed 
price), log 
WDI 
Secondary industry Share of secondary sector in total 
GDP, % 
WDI 
Openness Ratio of total trade (exports and 
imports) to GDP, % 
WDI 
Urban Share of urban population in the total 
population, % 
WDI 
Young population Share of young population (ages 0-14) 
in total population, % 
WDI 
Elderly population Share of young population (ages 65 
and above) in total population, % 
WDI 
IV: Weighted fiscal 
decentralization 
The weighted average of fiscal 
decentralization from the neighboring 
countries (weighted by the contiguity 
matrix) 
Authors’ 
calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
